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SEPARATING POWER: NO
LEGISLATIVE VETO OF AGENCY
ACTION
Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha1
One of the most remarkable features of 20th century American govern-
ment has been the growth of the administrative agency. Delegation of author-
ity to agencies has been frequent and broad. For the past fifty years, Congress
has included a number of specific legislative veto provisions in some statutes as
a means of checking these otherwise broad delegations.' From the beginning
of this practice in 1932, over 200 federal statutes containing more than 300
specific veto provisions have been enacted, most of which have occurred since
1970.3
In Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the United States
Supreme Court struck down the legislative veto provision of section 244 of the
Immigration & Nationality Act by a 7-2 vote.8 This opinion is the first by the
Court to address the validity of the legislative veto, and it appears to invali-
date veto provisions in many federal statutes. Given the breadth of its holding,
Chadha could be the last Supreme Court opinion on the legislative veto.
The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Burger, focused exclu-
sively on the legislative veto's failure to satisfy the requirements of bicameral
action and presentment to the President as set out in article I, section 7 of the
Constitution.6 The Court broadened the lower court's holding7 and departed
significantly from other cases where the Court has considered conflicts be-
tween coordinate branches of the federal government over the proper alloca-
1. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
2. The first legislative veto provision appeared in the Act of June 30, 1932, ch.
314, § 407, 47 Stat. 382, 414, which authorized President Hoover to reorganize the
government.
3. See generally Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Re-
sponse to Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 IND. L.J. 323, 324
(1977) (identified 295 provisions in 196 statutes).
4. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982).
5. Chief Justice Burger wrote the opinion for a six justice majority, and Jus-
tice Powell concurred on separate grounds. Justice White was the only Justice dissent-
ing on the constitutional merits. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice White, dissented
solely on the issue of whether § 244 was severable.
6. 103 S. Ct. at 2781-84. "Every bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the
President of the United States;. . ." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7.
7. Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 103 S. Ct. 2764
(1983).
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tion of governmental power. 8 While the majority's opinion is clearly supporta-
ble, it is not free from difficulty, as the concurring9 and dissenting 0 opinions
point out. The chief objection is the majority's failure to harmonize satisfacto-
rily the decision in Chadha with the Court's previous decisions allowing the
modern administrative state to develop.
1
'
Jagdish Rai Chadha came to the United States in 1966 on a nonimmi-
grant student visa. When that visa expired on June 30, 1972, he became sub-
ject to deportation. 2 Following his January 11, 1974 show cause hearing held
pursuant to section 242(b) of the Immigration & Nationality Act (Act),13
Chadha applied for suspension of deportation and permanent residence under
section 244(a)(1) of the Act. 4 The immigration judge found that Chadha met
the section 244(a)(1) requirements and suspended the deportation.15
Under section 244(c)(1) of the Act, suspensions of deportation are re-
ported to Congress along with a summary of the record.' 6 Either the Senate or
the House may "veto" the suspension under section 244(c)(2) by passing a
resolution stating it does not favor the suspension.' 7 If such a resolution is
passed, the Attorney General must deport the alien. On December 16, 1975,18
the House passed a resolution without debate or a recorded vote lifting the
suspension of deportation of Chadha and five others because they "did not
8. See notes 105-11 and accompanying text infra.
9. 103 S. Ct. at 2788 (Powell, J., concurring).
10. Id. at 2792 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 2816 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
11. See notes 112-15 and accompanying text infra.
12. 103 S. Ct. at 2770; see 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(9) (1982).
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1982).
14. 103 S. Ct. at 2770; see 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1982). This section allows
the Attorney General to suspend deportation and adjust the status of certain aliens to
that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if deportation would cause
the alien "extreme hardship."
15. In re Chadha. No. A17 385 958 (I.N.S. San. Fran. June 25, 1974), re-
printed in Jurisdictional Statement at app. B, Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764.
16. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(1) (1982): "If the deportation of any alien is suspended
under the provisions of this subsection, a complete and detailed statement of the facts
and pertinent provisions of law in the case shall be reported to the Congress with the
reasons for such suspension."
17. Id. § 1254(c)(2) provides:
[I] f during the session of the Congress at which a case is reported, or prior to
the close of the session of the Congress next following the session at which a
case is reported, either the Senate or the House of Representatives passes a
resolution stating in substance that it does not favor the suspension of such
deportation, the Attorney General shall thereupon deport such alien or au-
thorize the alien's voluntary departure at his own expense under the order of
deportation in the manner provided by law. If, within the time above speci-
fied, neither the Senate nor the House of Representatives shall pass such a
resolution, the Attorney General shall cancel deportation proceedings.
18. This was a delay of one and a half years from the immigration judge's order
of June 25, 1974 suspending deportation, and was three days before the end of the first
session of the 94th Congress, which would have been the last time Congress could have
acted. No reason for this delay is found in the record. 103 S. Ct. at 2771.
1984]
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meet [the] statutory requirements, particularly as . . . to hardship."'1
Following the House veto, the immigration judge reopened the deporta-
tion hearing. Chadha moved to terminate the deportation proceedings on the
grounds that the legislative veto provision, section 244(c)(2), was unconstitu-
tional.20 The immigration judge denied the motion, holding he had no author-
ity to rule on the question, and ordered Chadha deported. 21 Chadha appealed
to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which held that it had no authority to
decide the constitutional issue and dismissed the appeal.2 Chadha then sought
review in the Ninth Circuit under section 106(a) of the Act.2 3 The INS joined
with Chadha in arguing that the legislative veto was unconstitutional.2 4 The
Ninth Circuit invited the Senate and the House to file briefs amici curiae.2 5
Following full briefing and oral argument, the court held that section
244(c)(2) was unconstitutional as violative of the doctrine of separation of
powers.2 6
Before reaching the constitutional merits,27 the majority of the Supreme
19. H.R. Res. 926, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. 40,247 (1975); 121
CONG. REC. 40,800 (1975).
20. 103 S. Ct. 2772.
21. In re Chadha, No. A17 385 958 (I.N.S. San. Fran. Nov. 8, 1976), reprinted
in Jurisdictional Statement at app. D, Chadha, afid, (Bd. of Immigration App. Feb.
11, 1977), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir.
1980), aftd, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
22. In re Chadha, No. A17 385 958 (Bd. of Immigration App. Feb. 11, 1977),
reprinted in Jurisdictional Statement at app. E, Chadha, rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980), affid, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983); see
Panitz v. District of Colum., 112 F.2d 39 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
23. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1982).
24. 103 S. Ct. at 2772.
25. Chadha v. INS, No. 77-1702 (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 1981); see also H.R. Res.
40, 97th Cong. 1st. Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H260 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1981); S. Res. 40,
97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S660 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1981) (congressional
authorizations for intervention).
26. Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, 436 (9th Cir. 1980), affid, 103 S. Ct. 2764
(1983).
27. The court briefly considered a number of questions concerning the jus-
ticiability of the case. Two of the questions-appellate jurisdiction and case or contro-
versy-appear to have been resolved in a novel manner.
The congressional parties argued that the INS was not a proper party to appeal to
the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1982). Congress argued the INS was not
an aggrieved party and could not appeal from the circuit court because INS had
agreed with Chadha and sought invalidation of § 244(c)(2) and had therefore received
all the relief that had been sought. The Court held that the INS was "aggrieved"
because the Ninth Circuit's decision prohibited the INS from taking an action it would
have otherwise taken-deporting Chadha. When an act of Congress is held unconstitu-
tional, the agency that administers the act may appeal as an aggrieved party, even if
the agency agrees with the decision of the Court. 103 S. Ct. at 2773.
The Court cited no authority for this holding, and it appears to be an extension of
existing law. The holding is consistent with at least one previous case that states the
"aggrieved party" requirement is not mandated by article III. Deposit Guar. Nat'l
Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333-34 (1980). In cases where a prevailing party has
3
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Court held first that the veto provision was severable from the remainder of
the Act.28 The majority believed that the provision was independent from the
rest of the Act and that Congress would have enacted the statute even if it
could not have included the legislative veto.29
A finding that the statute was not severable would have ended the case.
Chadha's suspension of deportation was based upon authority conferred by
section 244(a).10 If all of section 244 would have been struck because the leg-
islative veto provision of section 244(c) was not severable, there would be no
authority to suspend Chadha's deportation. If the provision was not severable,
Chadha could not have won because prevailing on the constitutional merits of
his claim would also deprive him of the authority allowing his deportation to
be suspended. Because the judicial relief requested-striking down the veto
provision-would not prevent or redress the claimed injury, it seems likely
Chadha would have lacked standing to bring the action if the provision had
been unseverable. 31
While the majority and the minority reached different results on the sev-
erability issue, 2 the disagreement is based primarily upon different readings of
congressional intent, rather than a disagreement as to the applicable legal
standard. Since the Act contains a severability clause, 33 the majority noted
there was a presumption of severability.3 Justice Rehnquist conceded that the
been able to appeal, however, there has been at least some continuing collateral adverse
effect that operated against the appealing party. Id.; Electrical Fittings Corp. v.
Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241 (1939). Thus, the rule set out by the Court seems
broader than previous cases where the prevailing party has been allowed to appeal.
There would be no continuing adverse effect operating against the INS.
There must be an article III case or controversy continuing throughout before a
party may appeal. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402 (1975); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
Here, the Court found adverseness primarily from the presence of the House and Sen-
ate as intervenors. 103 S. Ct. at 2778. Further, the Court stated that INS and Chadha
were adverse parties prior to congressional intervention. This does not resolve the ques-
tion of whether a case or controversy still existed between INS and Chadha. The INS's
status as an aggrieved party was based upon the fact that INS may not now deport
Chadha. While this basis does make the INS adverse to Chadha for purposes of appeal
to the Supreme Court, the INS is only adverse by virtue of the merits of the decision
directly and not by an adverse effect that is collateral to the decision on the merits.
Four other justiciability issues were also raised and quickly resolved. Id. at 2776-80.
28. 103 S. Ct. at 2774.
29. Id.
30. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1982); see note 14 supra.
31. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 79
(1978).
32. Compare 103 S. Ct. at 2774-75 with id. at 2816 (Rehnquist J., dissenting).
33. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 406, 66 Stat. 166, 281, re-
printed in 8 U.S.C. § 1101 note (1982): "If any particular provision of this Act, or the
application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the
Act and the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be
affected thereby."
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clause created a presumption, but he stated that the ultimate determination
depends upon "the intent of the lawmakers" and that the presence of a sever-
ability clause rarely controls.3" The severability clause and resulting presump-
tion allocate the burden of persuasion to the side arguing the provision cannot
be severed. 36 Although Congress was arguing the provision was not severable,
the majority held there was not sufficient evidence showing intent in the legis-
lative history to rebut the presumption of severability.37
The majority and the dissenters drew substantially different inferences
from the legislative evolution of section 244. Until 1940, an alien subject to
deportation could remain in the United States only if his status was altered by
a private bill passed by both houses and approved by the President.38 In 1940,
Congress granted discretion to the Attorney General to suspend deportation
unless Congress, by concurrent resolution, disapproved the suspension.39 In
1948, while widening the category of aliens whose deportations could be sus-
pended, Congress limited the authority of the Attorney General by requiring
approval of the suspension by concurrent resolution.40 By 1952, Congress
sought to avoid the requirement of action on each suspension of deportation by
enacting the predecessor of section 244(c)(2), which allowed one house to veto
the Attorney General's suspension by resolution. 41
The majority viewed this history as an attempt by Congress to relieve
itself from the burden of private bills. Thus, even if Congress knew that sec-
tion 244(c)(2) would be unconstitutional, it was not clear they would have
continued to subject themselves to "the onerous burdens of private bills."' 2
Justice Rehnquist concluded that the history showed Congress always insisted
on ultimate control and that Congress had never indicated a willingness to
allow suspension of deportation without a veto.43
Despite the Court's holding on the constitutional merits, the majority con-
cluded that the statute remains a workable administrative mechanism.44 An
alien's suspension of deportation will still be reported to Congress under sec-
35. 103 S. Ct. at 2816 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Jack-
son, 340 U.S. 570, 585 n.27 (1968)).
36. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 312 (1936).
37. 103 S. Ct. at 2775.
38. Id. at 2774; see Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, § 14, 43
Stat. 153, 162.
39. Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 439, § 20, 54 Stat. 670, 671.
40. Act of July 1, 1948 ch. 783, 62 Stat. 1206.
41. Immigration & Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 244, 66 Stat. 163, 214
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 1254(c)(2) (1982)).
42. 103 S. Ct. at 2775.
43. Id. at 2817 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 2776. This part of the severability analysis would be different under
Justice Powell's reasoning. Section 244 would not remain fully operative via the use of
a private bill because the Congress would still be improperly undertaking a judicial
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tion 244(c)(1) and such a suspension is revocable through a private bill passed
by both chambers and approved by the President. Thus, congressional over-
sight of the delegated authority is preserved.4"
Although the minority does not appear to dispute the majority's conten-
tion that the statute remains "workable," the minority states that the Court's
holding expands the scope of the statute because section 244(c)(2) is an ex-
cepting provision."6 The legislative veto provision serves as a limitation on the
authority of the Attorney General. While Congress may still limit the actions
of the Attorney General, the added hurdles of bicameral action and present-
ment to the President yield a very different and unquestionably lesser degree
of limitation. By holding the Act severable, Justice Rehnquist believes the
statute which remains is now broader than the statute Congress originally in-
tended to enact. The remaining statute is thus a substantially larger delegation
of power, and the courts should not sever a statutory provision when that is the
result.4 7
Chadha provides little guidance 8 for the future severability battles that
may develop.49 A standard focusing on legislative intent will likely result in
45. 103 S.Ct. at 2775-76. The Court's holding converts § 244 into a "report
and wait" or laying provision, similar to that employed when the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure were promulgated. See Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064, 1070
(current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976)). This practice was approved by the Court
in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941). It is not clear how long the agency
must wait. It presumably is the same time period extending to the end of the next
following session from when the suspension is reported. Unlike most formulations of the
report and wait procedure, where the proposed action is not effective until the waiting
period is over, the suspension of deportation by the Attorney General will be effective
unless Congress acts within the designated time period.
46. 103 S. Ct. at 2816-17 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
47. Id.
48. The Court has declined an opportunity to further explore the severability
issue in another legislative veto case, Consumers Energy Council, Inc. v. FERC, 673
F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (struck down veto section and found the provision severable
even though there was no severability clause), affd mem. sub nom. Process Gas Con-
sumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983). The D.C. Circuit
adopted an analysis similar to the dissenters in Chadha: "We do not view the imposi-
tion of any unspecified burden of persuasion on either side as beneficial to the inquiry."
673 F.2d at 442 (citing United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585 (1968)).
49. Four factors make it appear that the "next case" is some time away. First,
the breadth of the majority opinion suggests that a veto will fail unless both houses act
and it is presented to the President. Second, in the wake of the Process Gas Consumers
Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983), aff'g Consumers Union,
Inc. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982), and Consumers Energy Council of v.
FERC, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), two of the better grounds for distinguishing
Chadha (that it does not apply to agency rulemaking or independent congressional
agencies) appear to be gone. Third, the legislative veto, while often enacted, is seldom
utilized. Finally, alternative means for Congress to "control" an agency are likely to be
used in order to achieve the desired result.
A district court in Mississippi has held that the Reorganization Act of 1977, Pub.
L. No. 95-17, 91 Stat. 29 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 912 (1982)), is unconstitutional
19841
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case by case examinations of each act's legislative history. Such a history is
often capable of two or more reasonable, but opposite, interpretations. Thus, a
controlling issue may be which side has the burden of persuasion as allocated
by the presumption resulting from the presence or absence of a severability
clause. 50 Additionally, a legislative veto by definition is a limiting provision,
and striking such a provision will generally widen the delegation of power con-
ferred by the statute. Subsequent cases where courts more adequately address
the permissible extent to which the remaining statute may be substantively
different from the original statute may yield a more predictable analysis.
The use of the legislative veto poses fundamental questions concerning the
allocation and structure of national power among the coordinate branches of
the federal government. Complicating the analysis is the use of the legislative
veto to control administrative agencies that straddle the elusive boundaries be-
tween the branches. In analyzing any given exercise of governmental power,
the threshold issue is federal authority.51 Then the inquiry shifts to determin-
ing which branch can exercise the power and what procedure must that
branch use to properly exercise the power.
This framework was used by the Ninth Circuit in holding that the consti-
tutional problem in Chadha was a violation of the separation of powers doc-
trine.52 The court held that the House's action was an impermissible legislative
intrusion into the judicial power5" or alternatively an impermissible intrusion
into the executive power." As a third ground, the Ninth Circuit held that even
if the House's action was a proper subject of legislative action it would not
stand because it failed to satisfy the article I, section 7 requirements of pre-
sentment and bicameral action. 55
A majority of the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's result but
declined to follow its framework, relying only on the third ground to the exclu-
sion of the first two."1 Justice Powell's concurrence primarily followed the rea-
because of the presence of a legislative veto provision that is unseverable from the
entire act. EEOC v. Allstate Ins. Co., 570 F. Supp. 1224, 1232 (S.D. Miss.), appeal
filed, 52 U.S.L.W. 3512 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1983). Other district courts that have consid-
ered this question have reached the opposite result. See Muller Optical Co. v. EEOC,
574 F. Supp. 946, 951 (W.D. Tenn. 1983); EEOC v. Jackson County, 33 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1089, 1092 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 13, 1983); see also EEOC v. Pan Am.
World Airways, 576 F. Supp. 1530, 1534 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (ruling withheld pending
Allstate appeal).
50. See notes 33-37 and accompanying text supra.
51. Federal authority over aliens was not an issue in Chadha. The constitutional
basis for this authority is found in the naturalization clause and necessary and proper
clause, article I, section 8, and the Court has consistently recognized that the federal
power over aliens is broad. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976).
52. Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, 435-36 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 103 S. Ct.
2764 (1983).
53. Id. at 429-30.
54. Id. at 431-33.
55. Id. at 433-35.
56. 103 S. Ct. at 2781.
[Vol. 49410
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soning of the first alternative used by the Ninth Circuit and found that the use
of the legislative veto in Chadha was an impermissible intrusion into the fed-
eral judicial function.57 Justice White's dissent found that the House's action
did not intrude into the functions assigned to the other branches 8 and that
article I, section 7 did not apply because the legislative veto is not legislation.59
Thus, unlike the concurring and dissenting opinions, the majority's hold-
ing is not based on the separation of powers doctrine per se, and the doctrine
as such is not discussed. The majority focused on the procedure by which Con-
gress must act while exercising power, not on whether the particular exercise
of that power impermissibly intrudes into the power allocated to another coor-
dinate branch of the federal government. This difference led to an analysis by
the majority that is substantially different from that employed by the concur-
rence and the dissent.
The majority avoided a prolonged discussion on the policy merits of the
legislative veto60 and proceeded directly to an analysis of the article I, section
7 requirements of presentment and bicameralism.61 The majority held that bi-
cameral action and presentment are necessary unless a specific section of the
Constitution authorizes unicameral action without presentment.62 The major-
ity noted that the "Great Compromise" 63 of bicameralism was considered so
important by the Framers that the provision may only be amended under arti-
cle V with the consent of the affected states.6 In the Court's view, these re-
quirements demonstrate the Framer's intention to require legislative action to
be the result of a single, unified procedure.65 The majority concluded that the
action of the House is legislative in character, and since it is not subject to
bicameral approval and presentment, it is outside the constitutional sphere of
the legislative branch.66
The House action in Chadha was legislative in character and effect be-
57. Id. at 2789 (Powell, J., concurring).
58. Id. at 2808-10 (White, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 2799-2800 (White, J., dissenting).
60. "Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives--or the
hallmarks-of democratic government ... " Id. at 2781.
61. 103 S. Ct. 2782-84.
62. Under article I, section 2, only the House initiates impeachment. Article I,
section 3 requires the Senate to conduct impeachment trials. Article III, section 2 gives
the Senate the power to approve or disapprove presidential appointments. Under article
II, section 2, only the Senate ratifies treaties. But cf. Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) 378 (1798) (presentment is unnecessary under article V, following the pas-
sage of a proposed amendment to the Constitution).
63. See A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 129-32
(1948); J. MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 206-13(G. Hunt & J. Scott ed. 1920); B. MITCHELL & L. MITCHELL, A BIOGRAPHY OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 59-69 (2d ed. 1975).
64. 103 S. Ct. at 2784; see U.S. CONST. art. V.
65. 103 S. Ct. at 2784; see THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (A. Hamilton); id. No. 62
(A. Hamilton).
66. 103 S. Ct. at 2785.
19841
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cause it altered the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons outside the
legislative branch.6 7 Because the legislature acted to affect rights and duties,
the majority concluded that the action must fully conform with the require-
ments of article I, section 7.68 The majority essentially asked which branch of
the government is affecting rights and duties, not what is the effect of the
action. The majority viewed the Attorney General's action under section 244
as the exercise of article II executive power.69 Even though executive action
under delegated authority resembles legislative action, it is not subject to bi-
cameral approval or presentment because the Constitution does not so re-
quire.70 Thus, defining what "type" of governmental power is being exercised
depends upon which branch is exercising the power rather than the nature of
the power itself. This syllogistic approach enabled the majority to state, "Con-
gress' authority to delegate portions of its power to administrative agencies
provides no support for the argument that Congress can constitutionally con-
trol administration of the laws by way of a Congressional veto."7' 1 Under the
majority's formulation, even though the governmental power is the same in
both instances, when Congress determines if an individual meets the statutory
criteria it is legislative action, but when the Executive branch makes the deter-
mination it is executive action.
The majority stated that the House's decision to deport Chadha was a
policy decision in the same vein as the original congressional delegation al-
lowing suspension of deportation.72 This analysis would be true if in the course
of the House's action it had purported to alter the standards under which
Chadha's suspension had been granted. The resolution affecting Chadha stated
the House committee believed he did not meet the already existing policy re-
quirements.73 Certainly the Congress, through a sustained exercise of legisla-
tive vetoes, may generate a defacto change in the policy embodied in a partic-
ular statutory scheme. Such a policy shift could be possible by even a single
veto.74
In a situation where the exercise of legislative vetoes would change a sub-
67. Id. at 2784.
68. Id. at 2787.
69. Id. at 2785 n.16; see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
70. 103 S. Ct. at 2785 n.16. The Court reasoned that the bicameral process is
not necessary to check this executive power because the power is limited by the statute
granting it. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2787.
73. 121 CONG. Rnc. 40,800 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Eilberg).
74. Such an occurrence appears to be at least partly at work in Consumer En-
ergy Council v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425 (1982), aff'd sub nora. Process Gas Consumers
Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983). FERC had promulgated
incremental pricing regulations, but the House vetoed the regulations. The veto was
primarily based upon a belief by most House members that changed circumstances
made the regulations unwise, despite the fact that the FERC was within its statutory
mandate. 673 F.2d at 437-38.
412 [Vol. 49
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stantive policy, the effect would be functionally equivalent to new legislation
that avoids bicameral approval and presentation. Such a situation might occur
as the composition of Congress shifts with the new membership having a dif-
ferent perspective of the "intent" of a particular legislative scheme. The facts
of Chadha, however, do not suggest such a policy shift. The executive and the
legislature simply disagreed as to whether Chadha met the requirements of the
statute authorizing suspension of deportation. Despite the absence of a clear
exposition of why this action by the House is a policy determination, the ma-
jority viewed this action by the legislative branch as legislative in character
and effect.75
This is the point at which the majority and the concurrence differ. The
concurring opinion advanced a narrower ground: when Congress finds that a
particular person fails to satisfy statutory criteria it has assumed a judicial
function in violation of the separation of powers doctrine.76 Thus, the majority
formulation started from the position that when the legislative branch exer-
cises any governmental power it must do so in the manner constitutionally
prescribed for legislation. The concurring opinion started from the position
that the powers of the various branches are functionally different and that one
branch may not exercise the power granted to another.7
This difference is more than theoretical. Under the majority formulation,
Congress may have deported Chadha only if a private bill had been introduced
and passed.7 8 Such a private bill would likely be unconstitutional under the
concurring formulation because it would still be an assumption of the judicial
power by the legislature.7 9 The concurrence views the function of legislative
power as that which prescribes general rules for the government of society.80
Since the House's action is directed specifically at whether Chadha has met
75. 103 S. Ct. at 2785-86.
76. Id. at 2784.
77. Id. at 2792 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Chadha, 634 F.2d at 430 ("By
assuming the task of correcting misapplications of the law, Congress is performing a
role ordinarily a judicial or an internal administrative responsibility."). The lower court
reasoned that if the veto is a method of sharing administration of the statute, it inter-
feres with a core function of the Executive. Id. at 431-33. If the veto is a residual
exercise of legislative power, it violates the requirement of bicameralism. Id. at 433-35.
78. While the majority stated this is the only way Chadha could be deported
after a suspension of deportation, no opinion as to the ultimate constitutionality of such
action was expressed. 103 S. Ct. at 2785 n.17.
79. Id. at 2791-92 (Powell, J., concurring). Although Congress possesses broad
power over aliens, Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976), a continuously present
alien has a right to due process when faced with deportation. Landon v. Plasencia, 103
S. Ct. 321, 329 (1982); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49-50 (1950). To
the extent that congressional action concerning a particular alien is considered an adju-
dication punishing an individual, it might be an unconstitutional bill of attainder. See
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 445-47 (1965); U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 9.
80. 103 S. Ct. at 2792 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S.
(6 Cranch) 87 (1810)).
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statutory criteria, it is adjudicatory. 81
The concurrence avoided any reliance on the presentment and bicameral
action requirements. Since the veto provision contained in the Act is unusual,
Justice Powell believed that depending upon the context, a particular veto pro-
vision may comply with the presentment clause, and that the majority's hold-
ing was unnecessarily broad. 82 Because none of the legislative veto provisions
currently in force require presentment, the application of the majority's deci-
sion would invalidate every use of the legislative veto.83 A two-chamber veto
would satisfy the requirement of bicameral action but would not satisfy the
rule in Chadha unless the action was presented to the President. In any event,
the requirements of bicameral action and presentment are closely related and
would be unlikely to apply differently to any particular congressional action.
Justice White's dissent did not dispute the Court's preliminary analysis
regarding presentment and bicameralism but rather stated that the article I,
section 7 requirements do not attach because the legislative veto is not a "Bill,
Order, Resolution or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House
of Representatives may be necessary."" The fundamental difference between
Justice White and the majority is that the dissent believed the House action is
not the equivalent of legislation. Justice White reached this conclusion by ex-
amining the function that the legislative veto is to fulfill against the role of
Congress in the constitutional scheme. Justice White does not infer disap-
proval of the legislative veto from the absence of a specific provision authoriz-
ing such a practice.85 He stated that the majority's analysis failed to recognize
the flexibility inherent in the Constitution and that the practice of government
requires the integration of separated powers.86 Justice White also suggested
only a modest role for the presentment clause, believing the clause serves only
to insure those items that are clearly the equivalent of legislation are presented
to the President.8" There is no clear textual statement in the Constitution con-
trolling when bicameral action and presentment is "necessary." Since the law-
making power of article I, section 8, particularly the Necessary & Proper
Clause, is "expansive," the dissent concluded that the Constitution is sufficien-
81. Id. at 2791.
82. Id. at 2788.
83. The Court recently declined to hear appeals in two other legislative veto
cases, Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 103 S. Ct. 3556
(1983), afig, Consumer Energy Council v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982) and
Consumers Union, Inc. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982). These cases struck
down legislative veto provisions as they applied to independent agencies. Process Gas,
103 S. Ct. at 3557 (White, J., dissenting).
84. 103 S. Ct. at 2972 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7).
85. 103 S. Ct. at 2798, (White, J., dissenting).
86. Id. (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635(1952) (Jackson J., concurring) ("While the Constitution diffuses power the better to
secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into
a workable government.")).
87. 103 S.Ct. at 2800 (White, J., dissenting).
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tly flexible and the power of Congress sufficiently wide to allow the legislative
veto.88
The Court combined a flexible reading of the Constitution with a recogni-
tion that Congress must have the power to legislate effectively in a changing
and complex world to allow the federal government to construct the modern
administrative state. In tracing the Court's sanction of broad delegations to
administrative agencies, the dissent noted that although administrative agen-
cies are in theory only to "fill up the details"89 under prescribed standards that
lay down an intelligible principle,90 in practice delegation has yielded stan-
dards of great breadth.91 Only two cases have held that a delegation to a gov-
ernment official or agency was unconstitutionally broad.92 While stating that
the constitutionality of such broad delegations has not "been put to rest," Jus-
tice White concluded that agency rulemaking is realistically and functionally
the same as lawmaking. 3
Justice White challenged the artificial character of the majority's defini-
tion of legislative action by pointing out that administrative bodies affect
rights and obligations of people outside the executive branch without the
checks of bicameral approval and presentment." Thus, if Congress can dele-
gate this power to the Executive branch, it should also be able to reserve to
itself the power to veto such agency action.95 Justice White was more con-
cerned with examining the function of the power than the label attached to it.
The dissent squarely addressed the basic flaw in the majority's analysis:
"Under the Court's analysis, the Executive Branch and the independent agen-
cies may make rules with the effect of law while Congress, in whom the Fram-
ers confided the legislative power. . may not exercise a veto which precludes
such rules from having operative force." '
The differing conclusions as to the constitutionality of the legislative veto
reached by the Justices can be explained in part by examining their origins.
The Constitution established three branches of government with each branch
possessing limited powers that are to be exercised in a specified manner. From
a constitutional point of view, any action by one of the branches requires two
questions to be answered in the affirmative: is the action within the delineated
power of that branch, and has the branch acted in the prescribed manner.
88. Id. at 2801 (White, J., dissenting).
89. Id.
90. See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
91. See Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289
U.S. 266, 285 (1933) ("public convenience, interest, or necessity"); FTC v. Gratz, 253
U.S. 421, 427 (1920) ("unfair methods of competition").
92. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama
Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). Neither case, however, was decided under a
separation of powers analysis.
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Since the majority addressed the second question first and answered it in
the negative, there was no need for Chief Justice Burger to go further. The
concurring and dissenting Justices both started their analysis with the first
question, although they reach different results. This difference in starting point
also affects the type of analysis used. The separation of powers doctrine is only
implicated when answering the first question. Deciding whether a particular
branch is acting within its defined power requires an examination of the pur-
pose of the action. That purpose must then be evaluated to see first, if any
branch may properly undertake the action, and second, to see if the act is
within the function of the branch taking the action.
The approach taken by the majority did not require examination of the
function of the legislative veto. The majority characterizes the veto in Chadha
as legislative action primarily because it is Congress that is acting. The action
by the House does alter the rights and duties of the people outside the legisla-
tive branch. Virtually all action taken by the government, however, has that
same effect. Clearly Chadha's rights and duties were altered in the original
decision by the immigration judge to suspend his deportation. Yet the majority
stated that the decision to suspend deportation is an executive power, not sub-
ject to bicameral action and presentment.
It is certainly difficult to draw any functional difference between the
agency action and the House action in this case. Nevertheless, the majority's
logic requires that this distinction be made. If the typical agency action is
defined to be "legislative," then under the holding in Chadha such action is
not permissible without fulfilling the requirements of article I, section 7. The
definitional approach taken by the majority provides a way for the legislative
veto to be struck down and still leave intact the constitutional foundation for
the modern administrative state. The majority avoided the necessity of balanc-
ing functions because the opinion was focused primarily in terms of insuring
that governmental power exercised by the legislative branch conforms with the
procedures of article I, section 7. While the Court's classification of adminis-
trative action as an exercise of article II executive power is supportable , 7 it is
difficult to harmonize with existing case law. Administrative power has been
referred to as "quasi-legislative"9' 8 with a "legislative effect." 99 Moreover, the
administrative power to deport aliens has been referred to as an exercise of
legislative power.100
97. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 141 (1976) (per curiam) (rulemaking is
"the performance of a significant governmental duty exercised pursuant to a public
law" and must therefore be performed by "Officers of the United States," who are
appointed by the President and therefore may not be legislatively appointed); see also
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213-14 (1976) (rulemaking is not the
power to make law, only the power to carry out the will of Congress).
98. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935).
99. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981); Batterton v.
Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 (1977).
100. Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 40 (1924).
[Vol. 49
13
Bledsoe: Bledsoe: Separating Power: No Legislative Veto
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1984
LEGISLATIVE VETO
Not all agencies are so easily characterized as "executive." Some agencies
have been regarded as legislative or independent agencies' 0 ' and therefore
calling their functions executive does not easily follow. Executive control of
these agencies is also limited."0 2 As noted earlier, unless the function of these
agencies is considered an executive function, the article I, section 7 require-
ments will attach.
The breadth of the rule announced in Chadha is a manifestation of the
Court's decision not to employ a separation of powers analysis. Perhaps the
most troublesome aspect of this treatment is that it does not require significant
examination of the relationships between the coordinate branches. The Court
made no attempt to discuss whether a legislative veto might apply differently
as between agency rulemaking and agency adjudication or whether the distinc-
tion between an executive agency, such as the INS, or an independent agency,
such as the FTC, is meaningful. 0 3 Indeed, under the Court's holding, the na-
ture of the underlying administrative action does not appear significant.10 4
While the article I, section 7 requirements are related to any separation
of powers analysis, the Court's emphasis on these clauses represents a shift in
approach toward cases involving conflicts among the coordinate branches. Pre-
vious cases focused more on whether a particular exercise of power by one
branch is an encroachment on the power of another branch. 0 5 Although the
101. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935) (FTC is a
legislative agency and independent of the Executive).
102. For example, the President may not remove FTC commissioners without
cause. Id. at 629. "[T]he President, as representative of the Executive, does not have a
claim to control the decisionmaking of independent agencies." Consumer Energy, 673
F.2d at 472.
103. The Court has denied review in two cases where these potentially distin-
guishing factors could have been explored, in both instances affirming holdings that the
legislative veto provision was unconstitutional. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Con-
sumer Energy Council, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983), affig Consumers Union, Inc. v. FTC,
691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982) and Consumer Energy Council v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425
(D.C. Cir. 1982). In Consumer Energy, the court held that the constitutionality of the
one-house veto is not dependent upon whether the agency is executive or independent.
The court also noted that the basis for creating independent agencies is to avoid politi-
cal interference in agency decisionmaking, and therefore their "independence" does not
advance the need for the legislative veto in order to provide political accountability. 673
F.2d at 472.
104. The majority made no attempt to distinguish rulemaking and adjudication.
Despite the fact that the action by the INS in this case is adjudication, the bulk of the
majority opinion is written in terms of the effect of a legislative veto on rulemaking.
105. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 118-24 (1976) (per curiam) (actions of
Congress interfered with the constitutional appointment power of President); United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (generalized claim of privilege may not interfere
with judicial function); see also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 119, 125 (1926)
(President may remove appointments without the advice and consent of the Senate);
Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 445 (1977) (law requiring the
presidential papers to be under the control of the administration did not interfere with
the Executive function); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-
88 (1952) (President's act of seizing steel mills was an improper assumption of a legis-
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constitutionality of a legislative veto presents unique questions, it does not pre-
ordain the type of analysis employed.10 8 While they reach different results, the
concurring and dissenting opinions both tested the constitutional viability of
this legislative veto provision primarily in terms of whether it intrudes into
another branch's constitutionally assigned function.
Previous cases considering inter-branch conflicts utilized an analysis of
function and a balancing of values that reflected a recognition of flexibility
inherent even within the doctrine of separation of powers. 10 7 The absence of
specific language in the Constitution has not, of itself, limited the actions or
power of a specific branch.105 The powers of the branches may even overlap to
some degree.10 9 One example is in the concept of "legislative courts," where it
lative role); see, e.g., J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 405
(1928); (tariff law was a permissible delegation of power); United States v. Klein, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871) (Act of Congress intruded into both judicial and executive
power).
106. The lower court, while undertaking an analysis under the presentment and
bicameral action clauses, primarily examined the veto provisions as potential encroach-
ments into the judicial and executive functions. It formulated three alternatives: (1)
impermissible encroachment into the judicial function; (2) impermissible intrusion into
the executive's administration function; and (3) impermissible avoidance of the article
I, § 7 requirements of bicameral action and presentment. 634 F.2d at 429-35.
In Consumer Energy Council v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), affd
mem. sub nom. Process Gas Consumer Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 103 S.Ct.
3556 (1983), while the court struck down a legislative veto provision primarily on the
basis of a violation of article I, § 7 requirements, it also held in the alternative that the
provision impinged upon the judicial and executive functions. 673 F.2d at 448.
In Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (per curiam), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978), the court upheld a legislative veto provision concerning
salary recommendations of some government officials by finding the provision did not
violate article I, § 7 and did not interfere with any essential executive function. Id. at
1063-70.
107. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 442 (1977) ("[Tlhe
more pragmatic, flexible approach of Madison in the Federalist [#47] and later of Mr.
Justice Story [1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 525 (M. Bigelow
5th ed. 1905)] was expressly affirmed by this Court only three years ago in United
States v. Nixon."); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976) (per curiam) (the three
branches of government are not "hermetically" sealed from each other).
108. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705-06 (1974) (executive privilege
has "constitutional underpinnings" despite the absence of a specific provision authoriz-
ing such a privilege); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("I. . . give to the enumerated powers the scope and
elasticity afforded by what seems to be reasonable practical implications instead of the
rigidity dictated by a doctrinaire textualism."); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135,
174 (1927) (both the House and Senate have subpoena power, including the power to
jail those who ignore process).
109. "[T]here is a zone of twilight in which [the President] and Congress may
have concurrent authority or in which its distribution is uncertain." Youngstown Sheet
& Tube, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall) 2, 114-24 (1866) (discussing whether Congress or the President has the au-
thority to suspend habeas corpus).
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is well settled that there is some limited federal judicial power that operates
outside the constraints of article 111.110 In the separation of powers context the
most enduring example of the flexibility of the Constitution is the existence of
the "fourth branch" of administrative agencies that routinely perform execu-
tive, legislative and judicial functions that are, as Justice Holmes said, "only
softened by a quasi."""'
The Chadha Court's resolution of the legislative veto issue, standing
alone, is not problematic. The decision is troublesome because it does not "fit"
within the constitutional scheme allowing Congress to delegate substantial au-
thority to agencies.' 12 Justice Powell's concurrence highlights this lingering in-
consistency. In his formulation, the House's action is invalid because it as-
sumed a judicial function of determining whether an individual had complied
with statutory criteria. Yet under the statutory scheme being considered, this
judicial function has been primarily delegated to the executive, and this dele-
gation poses no problem for Justice Powell."13 It is true that the act provides
for judicial review"14 and for detailed administrative procedures." 5 The ab-
sence of these types of procedural safeguards highlights the impropriety of the
House's action." 6 Judicial review of the agency's action is limited, however,
and Chadha's position before the immigration judge is of a different character
than if he had been before an article III court in the first instance. The point
here is not to question the constitutionality of the delegation of authority to
the INS but to suggest that the shortcoming of the Court's analysis is its fail-
ure to seek any unifying principle that reconciles the decision in Chadha with
the reality of the modern administrative state.
Justice Powell's concurrence and his reservation of the broader present-
ment clause issue for another day is persuasive. Deferral would have allowed
the Court the opportunity to resolve the competing values of the government's
need to delegate power within the separation of powers doctrine in the context
of a case where the issue was more squarely put. The majority's approach, by
relying on a more literal application of the Constitution, yields a more widely
applicable result because none of the current legislative veto provisions in force
110. Congress may under a specific article I power provide a federal forum even
if article III might otherwise deny such a forum. National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater
Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 600 (1949). There is at least some article III judicial
power which may be exercised by non-article III courts. See, e.g., Palmore v. United
States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973); Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962). But see North-
ern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 76 (1982) (bank-
ruptcy courts are not beyond the reach of article III, and non-article III courts may not
adjudicate private rights arising solely from state law.)
111. Springer v. Philippine Island, 277 U.S. 189, 210 (1928) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
112. See notes 107-11 and accompanying text supra.
113. 103 S. Ct. at 2792, n.10.
114. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1982).
115. Id. § 1252(b).
116. 103 S. Ct. at 2792.
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require presentment. However, the majority opinion stands in stark contrast to
the Court's flexible approach toward congressional delegation of power to ex-
ecutive and independent agencies. Congressional action in response to the de-
mands of modern government has been examined under one standard, while
congressional action in response to the modern government thus created ap-
pear to be examined under a different standard.
The problem that remains after Chadha, for Congress and for the Court,
is the same problem that gave rise to the case itself-what avenues are availa-
ble to control the exercise of power by administrative agencies. Current con-
gressional efforts seem to be directed at two alternatives. The first alternative
is essentially a laying provision where proposed rules would go into effect after
a specified period unless Congress disapproves by passing a joint resolution
that is presented to the President.1 1 7 The second method requires rules to be
approved by a joint resolution and presented to the President before they can
become effective.""' While both alternatives appear to be consistent with the
holding of Chadha, they would appear to have significant practical differences.
The second alternative essentially has the agency recommending legislation.
Congress must act affirmatively before rules become effective under the second
alternative, but rules would become effective under the first alternative when-
ever Congress took no action; thus, it seems likely that the first alternative
would result in more rules becoming effective.
Since the majority did not distinguish between agency rulemaking and
agency adjudication, the question of whether the Congress may in some situa-
tions "veto" an agency adjudication may become an issue in some later case.
Generally, the Court may be in a position to reexamine the non-delegation
doctrine. Although the doctrine has been dormant since the mid-thirties, Jus-
tice White indicated that the limits of the doctrine "have not been put to
rest."119 Justice Rehnquist and some commentators have also suggested that
the doctrine be revived.1 20
In Chadha, the Court has broadly reduced, and perhaps totally elimi-
nated, the availability of the legislative veto as a congressional remedy for
controlling administrative agencies. The Court shed little light on identifying
the underlying cause of tension that results from the allocation of governmen-
tal authority to administrative agencies that sit on the boundaries between
117. See note 45 supra.
118. These two alternatives were placed in the Consumer Product Safety
Amendments of 1983. S. 861, H.R. 2668, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 129 CONG. REc.
H4769, H4771 (daily ed. June 29, 1983).
119. 103 S. Ct. at 2802.
120. Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 686-87
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (the "Court should take up its burden of ensuring
that Congress does not unnecessarily delegate important choices of social policy to po-
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